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Three Forks Ranch Corporation ("Three Forks") appealed the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado's dismissal of
its complaint requesting damages and an injunction against the City of
Cheyenne, Wyoming, the Cheyenne Board of Public Utilities, Wyoming's State Engineer, and Wyoming's Water Development Commission (collectively "Wyoming Defendants"). Three Forks' complaint
alleged Three Forks owned Colorado water rights and the Wyoming
Defendants diverted additional water from the Little Snake River Basin
for Cheyenne's municipal supply. The Little Snake River Basin flows
south of Wyoming across the Colorado border and the Three Forks
property was the first property downstream from the Wyoming Defendants' intended diversions. Three Forks owned Colorado water rights
with a priority date of 2000 and claimed the Wyoming Defendants'
diversions violated the Colorado River Basin Compact ("Compact") by
injuring those water rights.
While Three Forks raised a variety of challenges to the district
court's decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit only considered whether the Compact provided Three Forks with
a private right of action that allowed Three Forks to invoke the Compact to protect Three Forks' rights. The Compact prevented parties
from interfering with the right of other parties to regulate water appropriation within their boundaries; however, the court held that the
Compact created no private right of action. The court determined no
private right of action existed under the Compact because: (1) Three
Forks was not a part of the class that the Compact was enacted to protect, (2) the intent behind the Compact did not support a private right
of action, (3) a private right of action was not consistent with the underlying scheme of the Compact, (4) the Compact lacked an explicit
private right of action, and (5) signatory states possess no right of action under the Compact. The court also concluded no private right of
action existed under the Compact because the Compact itself only apportioned water among the states, and did not create private water
rights.
Finally, the court addressed Three Forks' argument that federal
common law created a private right of action under the Compact. The
court held that only signatories of the Compact could assert federal
common law theories under an interstate water compact. Because
Three Forks was not a signatory of the Compact, it could not assert
such a right of action. The court accordingly held the Compact provided no private right of action for Three Forks and affirmed the decision of the District Court dismissing Three Forks' complaint.
Jared Ellis
COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
Fraser Constr. Co. v. United States, No. 03-5155, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20338 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 27, 2004) (affirming the trial court's

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

judgment that the contractor failed to prove the elements of a constructive acceleration claim and subsequently, was not owed additional
compensation under the contract).
In 1993, the Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps") contracted
Fraser Construction Company ("Fraser") to excavate material from the
bottom of Silver Lake in connection with the Corps' flood control project on the South Fork Zumbro River in Rochester, Minnesota.
Fraser designed a dike capable of withstanding a water flow rate of
800 cubic feet per second to divert the stream running through the
otherwise dry lakebed. The Corps informed Fraser of the likelihood of
damage to the dike due to high water flows. Their contract stipulated
severe, unanticipated weather could warrant an extension, however,
delays due to anticipated water flow could not. High water flows continually flooded the work site from May through the month of August.
Each month Fraser negotiated with the Corps for an extension. In
July, Fraser asked for monetary relief and asserted a constructive acceleration claim. The Corps denied the acceleration claim, as well as the
request for equitable adjustment, but granted extensions amounting to
thirty days due to the rain and times when the wetness prevented the
use of the truck. The Corps did not grant extra days based on the inadequacy or poor design of the trench and diversion system. After
completing the project, Fraser asked the contracting office for additional compensation because the Corps denied reasonable extensions
and made Fraser work in flood conditions, which subsequently caused
Fraser substantial expenses.
Following the contracting office's denial, Fraser filed suit in the
Court of Federal Claims. The trial court initially granted summary
judgment in favor of the Corps, but the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, finding genuine issues of material fact, remanded the case
for trial. The trial court ultimately ruled Fraser failed to establish its
constructive acceleration claim.
An acceleration claim asserts that the government shortened the
time of performance, thereby modifying the contract and entitling the
contractor to compensation. The circuit court stated a constructive
acceleration claim must prove: (1) an excusable delay under the contract, (2) the contractor requested an extension in a timely manner,
(3) the government denied the request or responded in an untimely
manner, (4) the government insisted the contractor complete the project, and (5) the contractor incurred extra expenses as a result.
On appeal, the circuit court examined whether the trial court
erred with regard to four issues: (1) the foreseeability of the delays and
the dike's destruction, (2) the timeliness of the Corps' extensions, (3)
Fraser's entitlement to long-term suspension, and (4) the nature of the
Corps' orders to continue performance.
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First, the trial court held Fraser failed to prove the delays resulted
from unforeseeable causes irrespective of any fault of Fraser. The circuit court specifically addressed the foreseeability of the high water
levels following high peak flows. Fraser conceded the overtopping of
the dike due to high peak flows was foreseeable, but argued the extended high water level that occurred days after the overtopping was
not foreseeable. The trial court reasoned that if Fraser designed the
dike to withstand foreseeable high peak flow incidents, than the higher
average daily flows would not have created problems. Therefore, the
circuit court concluded the trial did not err in its analysis.
Next, Fraser argued argument the Corps' thirty-day extension was
inadequate. Fraser asserted the Corps' extension was untimely, was
only granted after adverse weather conditions occurred, and the Corps
forced Fraser to work during the period anyway. The trial court reasoned the Corps expressed a willingness to grant extensions and the
Corps did not necessarily need to grant extensions on the spot. The
circuit court agreed with the trial court's finding against Fraser on this
issue.
Third, Fraser contended the Corps' extension was inadequate because the project should have been suspended rather than just extended. However, Fraser failed to specify dates that the Corps should
have granted an extension. In addition, evidence showed that during
times of dike repair, Fraser could still haul material from the excavation site. The circuit court again found no error in the trial court's
decision that Fraser failed to show its entitlement to long-term suspension.
Finally, the circuit court reviewed the trial court's holding that the
Corps' insistence that Fraser uphold the contract and complete the
project did not constitute forced acceleration of performance. Fraser
asserted the Corps pressured Fraser to finish the job while also refusing
to grant every requested extension. The Corps presented evidence it
was willing to grant extensions for which Fraser had sufficient claim.
Despite the mixed evidence, the circuit court agreed with the trial
court's decision that it was reasonable for the Corps to remind Fraser
of its responsibility and insist Fraser complete the project according to
the contract.
Thus, the circuit court concluded the trial court did not err and affirmed the trial court's ruling that Fraser failed to prove its claim of
constructive acceleration.
Lynn Noesner
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Cent. Valley Water Agency v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (E.D.
Ca. 2004) (holding when Congress enacted the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act, Congress deferred to the Bureau of Reclamation
regarding the operation of the Central Valley Project in California in

